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Pity the authors of books on Russia and the states of the former USSR  it's very hard to be 
up-to-date. Consider Anatoly Khazanov's section on the Chechen war (written in May 
1995). He says, "Moscow's scenario for the solution of the Chechen problem closely 
resembled the previous Soviet scenarios of the interventions in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, 
and Afghanistan." He describes how a phony opposition was created and bolstered by 
plenty of falsehoods; then, when Plan A failed, military intervention followed. He 
concludes: "The Chechen crisis proved to non-Russian citizens of the Russian Federation 
that the federative character of this state exists mainly on paper. Many of them are 
convinced now that the Russian Empire has never ceased to exist." It also gave the 
Russian people the message that "they have no rights." He finishes the chapter with a 
dark warning that, once again, people are becoming afraid to talk openly. Well, the 
pattern he describes is not so far from the French scenario in Indochina or Algeria 
(formerly an "integral part" of France), the American one in Vietnam, or the Nigerian in 
Biafra or all the rest of the cheerless list. It appears that there may be a larger pattern here 
than merely a Soviet/Russian one. As to the state of Russia's imperfect democracy, in 
1997 people continue to speak openly and an argument can be made that the Russian 
press covered the war with less censorship  apart from the self-censorship during the 
presidential election campaign  than most other wars have received. Certainly, as this 
reviewer can attest, there were plenty of horrible scenes of charred bodies in burnt-out 
armored vehicles and destruction shown on TV at the time. There was very little 
supporting the official line of "anti-bandit operations, which will be completed next 
weekend." But he is led to the conclusion that the Chechen war showed the real face of 
post-Soviet Russia. Would observers say this today? Human stupidity (and greed), rather 
than devious cunning, seem to have been the real impellers of th Chechen disaster. 
Indeed, the "problem" of Chechnya is not just Russia's; no one has recognized an 
independent Chechnya because few states are ready to recognize separatism for fear the 
disease may be contagious. Russia is not the first country to have gone to war to prevent 
separation. And not the first to have lost that war.  
The book appears to be more a collection of essays centred on nationalism than a book 
with a single theme. This can create inconsistencies. For example, in an excellent 
discussion of nationalism in its various forms in Chapter 3, he shows that he is very well 
aware of just how arbitrary a "nationality" could be. "Nationality" in the USSR was an 
obligatory designation and every Soviet citizen was a member of a "nationality" and only 
one. The classification could be very capricious: some ethnic groupings were lumped 
together: Svans with Georgians; others split apart: Circassians into Cherkess, Kabardins 
and Adigey. The reality of mixed ancestry was never recognized  every Soviet citizen had 
one, and only one, official nationality. One of my hobbies is asking "Russians" whether 
all four of their grandparents were "Russian"; very few can say they were. And yet all are 
counted as "Russian." This definitional fact greatly affects the statistics that he quotes at 
other times. When it is said, for example, that x percent of a particular country are 
Russians, just what is meant? And it begs the question of just what a "Russian" is 
anyway. Few ethnic designations are as mixed as that one: Norse Varangians, forest 
peoples like the Finno-Ugric group, Slavs in all their variety, horse peoples like Alans 
and Pechenegs, Turko-Mongols and Europeans. That's what a "pure" Russian is. No 
wonder they spend so much time trying to agree on a national identity. "Russian" is 
probably more of a cultural definition than anything else. Consider the three commanders 
at Borodino  and a typically "Russian" group they were too: Kutuzov (the name sounds 
Turkic), Barclay de Tolly (a Frenchified Scot) and Bagration (a Georgian). But, 
elsewhere in the book, the author quotes the official statistics as if they actually meant 
something. The only data comes from the 1991 USSR Census  there have been none 
since  and it is corrupt. First, it categorizes people into a false ethnic purity; second, the 
figures were then cooked to reflect the currentinterpretation of Marxist-Leninist 
orthodoxy. If 25 percent of "Ukrainians" are married to non-"Ukrainians" (so the Census 
tells us) then how "Ukrainian" are their children? For what it's worth, Russia is 
abandoning the communist nationality/citizenship system: the new passports have the 
single designation of Russian citizen.  
Continuing the patchy nature of the book are chapters on ethnicity in Central Asia, in 
Kazakhstan, the plight of the Mezkhetians who are shunned by everyone (thousands are 
living wretchedly in Moscow as refugees), the Sakha (called Yakuts by Russians) and the 
rather despairing chapter on Chechnya. There is no reason given why these peoples are 
the ones to be especially considered and the chapters do not appear to be linked together 
unless by the theme that communism made a mess of the national question and that it will 
be a mess for years to come.  
Is the mess the fault of the Russians? Sometimes he seems to suggest that it is: certainly 
in the sections from the Chechnya chapter already cited, there is more than a hint that the 
Russians cannot bring themselves to have any other national policy than the fist and a 
suggestion that Soviet policy favored Russians. On the other hand, in the chapter on 
Sakha, he seems to suggest that in old Russia, Russians lived together reasonably happily 
with the Sakha and that many Russians actually could speak the language. So maybe it's a 
legacy of communism and not Russianism.  
The fact is that, in the post-USSR, the bulk of the violence has been between, not 
Russians and some other people, but as Georgia unhappily demonstrates, the titular 
majority and a minority. What was freedom for Georgians seemed to many Ossetians and 
Abkhazians to be slavery for them. The author knows this - as he says, the first Georgian 
president, Gamsakhurdia, "considered ethnic minorities living in Georgia the major threat 
to the Georgian people," but he does not seem to draw larger conclusions from it. A 
conclusion that he could draw might be that perhaps the nationalism preserved by the 
Soviet nationality policy was the nineteenth century exclusive or tribal form of 
nationalism rather than the sort of inclusive nationalism that we see today taking shape in 
Europe. Another might be that this form of nationalism left powerful impressions in the 
psyches of the so-called "little peoples" of the USSR because they were forced into 
Stalin's model of "socialist in content, nationalist in form." In short, every time you put 
on your national costume for the national holiday you were reminded a) that you were 
such-and-such a nationality and b) that the Communist Party actually ran things in your 
republic. He suggests his awareness of this when he says, in his conclusion, that "[the 
USSR] has skipped the twentieth century and to some degree the nineteenth century 
also." An exploration of that thought would have been fruitful and interesting.  
Moscow's relations with minorities in the Russian Federation, on the other hand, have 
been much more peaceful and creative. Sakha, for example, negotiated a treaty of mutual 
relations with Moscow in June 1995  after the book went to press, it is true, but Sakha 
was the fourth republic to do so. At present, ten national areas have negotiated similar 
treaties and so have 17 oblasts. With the exception of Moldova (which negotiated a 
similar arrangement with its Gagauz minority) none of the ex-USSR states has done so. 
And most of them  Georgia again is an example  have taken a lot longer to come round to 
a federalist solution than Russia did. These treaties suggest that there actually is some 
meaning to the word "federation" in the Russian Federation. But the author does not say 
very much about them  indeed, he speaks of an "imperial tendency" on Moscow's part 
taking shape toward Tatarstan, the first to gain such a treaty (in February 1994). It's a pity 
that he doesn't discuss these treaties because they, much more than the stupid and horrible 
war in Chechnya, appear to be the pattern that Moscow favors. The process has not 
stopped  five more oblasts got their treaties in July this year.  
The best parts of the book are the sections in which the author knowledgeably discusses 
the ethnic situation in specific territories or countries as well as his essay on nationalism 
in Chapter 3. The weak part of the book is precisely the attempt to make it into something 
more general.  
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